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FEATURE
ARTICLES
Have You Been "Spotted"?
Recognizing and Attacking One of
the Most Widespread AutomobileDealer Abuses
ChristopherV Langone
Joel D. Dabisch
I. A TYPICAL SPOT-DELIVERY SCENARIO'
On October 6, 1997, Cathy Carbuyer visits Daffy
Dan's Drive-Away to purchase a used automobile. The
car she is currently driving gets her around, but she has
been required to put more money into it for repairs than
she would prefer. So, she decides to buy something a
little more dependable. After looking around the lot for a
while, Cathy chooses a 1996 Wasabi Thunderbolt XJS. The
cash price of the car is $9,800.00. As a down payment for
the car, she trades in her old car (for which Daffy Dan's
gives her $1,500 applied toward her purchase) and gives
Daffy Dan's an additional $1,000 in cash. She signs a Bill
of Sale for the car and then proceeds to the finance
manager's office to take care of the financing. After waiting for several hours in the finance manager's office,
Cathy is told that financing has been obtained and that
the Thunderbolt belongs to her. Cathy happily drives her
new Thunderbolt home. For the next few weeks, Cathy
shows off the Thunderbolt to all of her friends, family,
and coworkers.
About two weeks later, Cathy receives a telephone
call from Daffy Dan in which Daffy Dan informs her that,
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because of some late payments she has made on credit
cards in the past, the financing "didn't go through."
Therefore, according to Daffy Dan, Cathy needs to return
to complete some more paperwork. This was the first
instance Cathy heard about a problem with her financing.
Confused, Cathy returns to Daffy Dan's to find out
what happened. Daffy Dan informs Cathy that she would
need to agree to new payment terms in order to keep the
Thunderbolt. Specifically, Daffy Dan tells Cathy that the
APR would have to be increased to 23.95%. Cathy is
shocked and angry because Daffy Dan had led her to
believe earlier that the APR was 14.00%. Cathy angrily
tells Daffy Dan that she no longer wants to do business
with him and asks that her down payment and trade-in
be returned to her. Daffy Dan then informs Cathy that
her trade-in has already been sold and that it will be
keeping part of her down payment to cover Cathy's use
of the Thunderbolt for the two-week period.
Now, faced with having no transportation at all
and with the prospect of losing part of her cash down
payment, Cathy agrees to the new payment terms. She
signs a new retail installment contract and is assured that
this time, because the financing was already approved by
the bank, there would not be any more problems. Again,
Cathy leaves with the Thunderbolt XJS.
Three weeks later, Cathy receives a letter in the
mail from the Financing-Is-Fun Finance Company stating
that it could not finance her purchase of the Thunderbolt
because of the late credit card payments that appeared on
her credit report. Worried that something might be
wrong, Cathy calls Daffy Dan's to inquire about the letter
from Financing-Is-Fun. This time, Daffy Dan informs
Cathy that it would not be able to finance the Thunderbolt at all. Daffy Dan then demands that Cathy return the
car. However, Cathy refuses to return the Thunderbolt
because she feels that she is entitled to possession of the
car.

Volume 12, Number 2 2000

Loyola Consumer Law Review

A few days later, Cathy receives a telephone call
from a man claiming to be a United States Marshall. The
"marshall" orders Cathy to give up possession of the
Thunderbolt. If she refuses, says the "marshall," she will
be criminally prosecuted. Scared, Cathy hangs up the
phone.
After a few more days, Cathy awakens one morning to sounds of breaking glass. By the time she grabs
her robe and runs to the front door of her house, it is too
late. She sees her Thunderbolt, which had been parked
safely in her garage, being hooked up to a tow truck by
an armed man in a blue uniform. Her garage had been
forcibly broken into and her car taken away.
II. WHY DO CAR DEALERS SPOT-DELIVER?
Typically, when a potential customer walks into a
car dealership, the dealer wants to put that person into a
car before he or she leaves to avoid losing the potential
customer to another dealership. If the dealer allows the
customer to comparison shop or think about the expense
of purchasing a particular car, the customer may not
return. So, the dealer wants the customer to become
committed to a particular car and to believe that the deal
is done. This way, even though the dealer may not know
whether financing can be obtained at the terms represented to the consumer, and may in fact be confident that
financing will not be obtained at the represented terms,
the consumer will become psychologically committed to
the deal. By the time the dealer informs the consumer
that financing could not be obtained at the agreed upon
terms, the consumer has already shown the new car to
all of her friends. She may have even invested more
money into the car by installing accessories, thereby
becoming emotionally and financially committed to the
car.
After the consumer becomes committed to the car,
the dealer will typically call and inform the consumer

Loyola Consumer Law Review

Volume 12, Number 2 2000

that financing could not be obtained at the earlier agreedto terms. As a result, the consumer must return to the
dealer to discuss other less-favorable financing terms. As
a further incentive to agreeing to less-favorable terms, the
dealer may inform the consumer that her trade-in vehicle
has been sold, preventing her from taking her trade-in
back and leaving. Additionally, the dealer might tell the
consumer that the consumer's down payment will not be
returned; rather, it will be retained by the dealer as compensation for the consumer's use of the car. With all of
these forces working against the consumer, he or she will
often agree to the less-favorable financing terms and the
dealer will have succeeded in its scheme.
In a spot-delivery transaction, the automobile
dealer has the customer sign a variety of documents, the
purposes of which are to bind the customer to purchase
the automobile. Upon the signing of the documents, the
dealer will deliver the vehicle "on the spot." Like the
situation above, the dealer will also usually take immediate possession of a customer's trade-in vehicle.
The documents signed by the customer typically
include a sales contract (i.e., a bill of sale or purchase
order), which is generally a dealer-drafted contract describing the vehicle and containing pricing and trade-in
information. While a bill of sale may reference that the
transaction will be financed, it generally does not include
the disclosures required by the Truth in Lending Act.
Likewise, a bill of sale may or may not contain language
indicating that the sales contract is contingent on financing, yet it is not a credit contract. Additionally, any contingency in the sales contract is not necessarily part of a
later credit contract.
Specifically, in a spot-delivery, the customer will
also be required to sign a binding credit contract. This
credit contract is generally a printed form supplied by a
third party to whom the dealer intends to assign the
contract. It is a combination installment contract, security
agreement, and Truth-in-Lending disclosure statement. It
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typically includes the closed-end credit disclosures required by the Truth in Lending Act 2 ("TILA") and the
corresponding implementing provisions of Federal
Reserve Board Regulation Z.3 This credit contract, however, does not typically contain terms making it contingent on the dealer's ability to sell it to a third-party
assignee.
In any car purchase, the customer will be asked to
sign a variety of documents necessary to consummate the
transaction. In almost any sale, these documents will
include a sale contract, an "incoming" odometer disclosure statement on the purchased vehicle, an assignment
of title (or power of attorney to do so) for any trade-in, an
"outgoing" odometer disclosure statement for the tradein, and a sales tax form. In a credit purchase, the documents will also include a credit application and a credit
contract. The customer may also sign additional documents relating to warranty coverage, credit insurance
and other associated items. In a spot-delivery transaction,
however, the most important documents are the retail
installment contract and the sale contract. These are the
documents that create obligations on the part of the
customer and the dealer regarding the vehicle. The customer is obligated to pay the dealer the amount in the
contract, and the dealer is obligated to deliver the vehicle
to the customer.
On occasion, a spot-delivery consumer will be
required to sign a spot "rider," the intended purpose of
which is to condition the transaction on financing. The
rider may be attached to the sale contract or to the credit
contract. The rider may also be a free-standing document
that does not specifically state to which document it is
attached. If used, a spot rider will contain language
similar to the following:
If Seller is unable to assign its right, title
and interest in the Contract to such sales
finance agency within three (3) days of this
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date and so notifies Buyer, Buyer shall,
within two (2) days of such notice, return
the Vehicle to Seller's place of business and
Seller shall return to Buyer all of Buyer's
deposits without setoff or deduction of any
amounts and the Contract shall then be null
and void...
This rider contains nothing more than a condition
subsequent to the contract. The underlying contract is
enforceable because, as the rider discloses, if the contract
is not assigned, it "shall then be null and void." As discussed below, this is a very important distinction.
III. WHAT THE ATTORNEY SHOULD KNOW
The scenario described above generates many
potential legal problems for the dealer. These include
potential violations of the Truth in Lending Act, the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act, state consumer-fraud acts, and
may also give rise to claims for common-law conversion
and fraud.
A. Failure to Properly Disclose the FinancingTerms Required
by the Truth in Lending Act
The federal Truth in Lending Act 4 requires that the
lender accurately give certain disclosures to the customer
when financing is provided in a consumer transaction,
including the sale of an automobile. These disclosures
include the amount financed, the finance charge, the
annual percentage rate, the payment schedule, the total of
payments, and whether any security is taken in connection with the transaction. The disclosures must be given
at the time a credit sale5 is "consummated," meaning
when a contractual obligation on the consumer's part is
created.6 If any of the information required to be disclosed is not known, the lender must make the disclo-
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sures based on the best information reasonably available
and must label the disclosures as estimates.
1. The "amountfinanced"
Section 1638(a)(2)(A) of the TILA requires that the
"amount financed" be disclosed as "the amount of credit 7
of which the consumer has actual use."8 In the transaction discussed above, since Cathy Carbuyer did not
actually receive financing on October 6, 1997, she did not
have actual use of the "amount financed" as disclosed.
Therein lies a TILA violation. Since the best information
reasonably available to the dealer was that financing for
Cathy Carbuyer was only possible and not definite at the
time of the execution of the contracts, the dealer should
have labeled the disclosures as estimates. 9
The Truth in Lending Act requires more than
mathematical precision; it requires that the disclosures
reflect the credit actually granted to the consumer. The
fact that the disclosures given by the dealer are mathematically correct as disclosed is of no consequence. The
dealer's inability to find a lender to whom it could assign
the loan is not an occurrence that excuses the inaccurate
TILA disclosures. Rather, in a typical spot-delivery transaction, whether the dealer is able to obtain financing for
the consumer's purchase of a car is a condition subsequent to the formation of a contract.
In contract law, a condition subsequent is a condition which divests liability that has already attached on
the failure to fulfill the condition. A condition subsequent
is different from a condition precedent, which must be
satisfied before the obligation becomes binding on the
parties. 10
The contracts involved in most spot-delivery
transactions contain language to the effect that the consumer is bound by the contract, but the contract may be
canceled if financing is not obtained within a certain time
frame. Thus, although the contract has become enforce-
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able, its continued enforceability depends on the dealer's
ability to obtain financing for the consumer. As a result, it
becomes a binding contract subject to a condition subsequent.1 Therefore, since the contract is enforceable,, a
credit obligation has been created on the part of the
consumer, i.e., "consummation"of the vehicle has occurred. Since accurate TILA disclosures must be given
before consummation, 12 the dealer may be liable for
violating the TILA 13 if the consumer does not have actual
use of the amount disclosed as the amount financed.
2. The annualpercentage rate
The TILA requires that the annual percentage rate
be accurately stated on an installment contract. 4 The term
"annual percentage rate," ("APR"), refers to the "actual
cost of borrowing money, expressed in [the] form of [an]
annual rate to make it easy for one to compare [the] cost
of borrowing money among several lenders or sellers on
credit."1 5 If the consumer does not have actual use of the
amount financed from the date disclosed on the contract,
the APR will be inaccurately stated. This is because the
APR depends on the length of the term of the contract. If
an installment contract states that the APR is calculated
based on a loan term beginning January 1, 2000, and, in
reality, the loan was not approved until February 1, 2000,
the consumer has had actual use of the amount borrowed
for one month less than the contract states. If the APR for
the same loan was calculated based on a term that began
on February 1, 2000, the resulting APR would be greater
because the consumer had use of the money for less time
despite the fact that the finance charge is the same. 6 So,
in spot-delivery transactions dealers systematically underestimate the APR.
In addition, if the dealer re-writes the consumer's
loan at a higher annual percentage rate, the rate may be
further underestimated if the dealer calculates the rate
based on the date of the original contract rather than the
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date of the new contract. For example, if the dealer backdates the retail installment contract, there is a sufficient
cause of action under the TILA. 17
B. Failureto Notify the Consumer of Adverse Action Taken on
a Credit Report in Violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act 18 ("ECOA") and
its implementing regulations require creditors to notify
credit applicants in writing if their applications for financing are denied. 9 The notification must be given to a
credit applicant within "30 days after receiving a completed application concerning the creditor's approval of,
20
counteroffer to, or adverse action on the application."
The notification must contain:
a statement of the action taken; the name
and address of the creditor; a statement of
the provisions of section 701(a) of the Act;
the name and address of the Federal agency
that administers compliance with respect to
the creditor; and either: (i) a statement of
specific reasons for the action taken; or (ii) a
disclosure of the applicant's right to a
statement of reasons within 30 days ....
The purpose of the notification requirement is to
give the applicant the opportunity to correct errors that
may have caused the rejection of their credit application.
Consumers are informed as to why they were denied
credit so that they can try to become more creditworthy
before applying for credit again.22 In addition, the notification requirements help prevent creditors from engaging
in discriminatory practices: "only if creditors know they
must explain their decisions will they effectively be
discouraged from discriminatory practices."'
Car dealers that regularly arrange for the exten-
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sion of credit to consumers are considered creditors
under the ECOA.24 As such, the dealer in the above
example is a "creditor" who must comply with the written-notification requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d) and
12 C.ER. § 202.9. 2 Furthermore, section 1691e(a) of the
ECOA states:
Any creditor who fails to comply with any
requirement imposed under this sub-chapter shall be liable to the aggrieved applicant
for any actual damages sustained by such
applicant acting either in an individual
capacity or as a member of a class.26
By failing to notify the consumer that the dealer was
unable to obtain financing for the consumer, the dealer
has violated the ECOA. Dealers often argue that a claim
under the ECOA requires the plaintiff to have alleged
discrimination in order to state a violation. However,
the clear language of the ECOA and the purpose behind
the ECOA clearly illustrate that discrimination is not an
element necessary to state a claim under the Act. 28 Moreover, the existence (or non-existence) of ECOA denial
letters may help the consumer determine the extent to
which the dealer shopped around for credit for the consumer.
C. Dealer Repossession and Section 9-503 of the Uniform
Commercial Code
In a typical automobile transaction, the retail
installment contract will grant the lender a security
interest in the purchased vehicle. But in a spot-delivery
transaction, questions arise as to whether the lender
possesses a security interest at all and, if so, whether the
lender can enforce the security interest against consumers
that have been "spotted." Therefore, if the dealer uses
self-help repossession to retake the vehicle, (as Dealer did
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with Cathy Carbuyer in the above example), the dealer
has probably overstepped the boundaries of the law.
Section 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code
provides that a secured party does have the right to
repossess collateral if the debtor defaults, and the "secured party may proceed without judicial process if this
can be done without breach of the peace or may proceed
by action." 29 Thus, in order to utilize self-help repossession, the lender must possess a valid security interest, the
consumer must be in default, and the lender must not
breach the peace in performing the repossession.
Since a car dealer will often argue in response to a
Truth in Lending Act claim that the retail installment
contract was never binding, and since the retail installment contract is typically the only document containing
language relating to the creation of a security interest, the
consumer's attorney can argue that no security interest
was ever created. The dealer cannot disclaim the validity
and enforceability of the retail installment contract while
simultaneously claiming the benefit of a security interest
contained in the retail installment contract. Without a
valid security interest in the vehicle, self-help repossession is illegal and the damages provisions of section 9-507
would most likely apply.
In addition, if the court finds that the dealer did
have a valid security interest in the vehicle, it is unlikely
that the consumer is in default under the contract. In a
typical spot-delivery transaction, the consumer's first
payment does not become due by the time the dealer
repossesses the vehicle. Without a default by the consumer, self-help repossession is illegal.
Finally, regardless of whether a valid security
interest exists or whether the consumer is in default, selfhelp repossession must not involve a breach of the peace.
The phrase "breach of the peace" connotes conduct that
incites or is likely to incite immediate public turbulence,
or that leads or is likely to lead to immediate loss of
public order or tranquility. 30 Examples include breaking
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into property or destruction of barriers designed to
exclude trespassers, 31 but does not include entry onto
private property so long as no gates, barricades, doors,
enclosures, buildings, or chains were breached or cut,
even though such entry might constitute criminal trespass. 32 Breach of the peace may also include unequivocal
oral protests.33
Claims for breach of the peace in violation of 9503, in many jurisdictions, can be brought against both
the repossession agent and the actual creditor because
repossession is generally viewed as a nondelegable
duty.-' As the Supreme Court of Texas stated, a creditor
cannot avoid liability for tortious repossession by hiring
an independent contractor to accomplish the repossession:
[t]he rule imposing liability on secured
parties for breaches of the peace is based on
longstanding policy concerns regarding the
exercise of force or violence. The preservation of peace, courts recognize, 'is of more
importance to society than the right of the
owner of chattel to get possession of it.' As
a general rule, when a duty is imposed by
law on the basis of concerns for public
safety, the party bearing the duty cannot
escape liability by delegating it to an independent contractorViolations of section 9-503 can lead to considerable
damages to the consumer including actual damages. In
the case of consumer goods such as automobiles, damages may include "an amount not less than the credit
service charge plus 10% of the principal amount of the
debt or the time price differential plus 10% of the cash
price. "36
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D. The Illinois Consumer Fraudand Deceptive Business
PracticesAct
7
Claims under Illinois' Consumer Fraud ActY
("CFA") evolve though several different means in a spotdelivery transaction. For example, a dealer may represent
that he will attempt to arrange financing at certain credit
terms with the intent that the consumers discontinue
their search for a car. While making these representations, the dealer knew that he would not shop around for
financing at those terms.38 After the negotiations for the
purchase have been completed, the dealer will call the
consumer to inform him that financing could not be
obtained, and then try to convince the consumer to sign a
subsequent contract containing less favorable terms. If
the dealer knew in advance that his attempt to arrange
financing for the consumer would fail or if the dealer
never requested financing at the agreed-upon terms, the
consumer can allege a violation of the CFA. 39 As noted
above, the consumer can gain some insight into the
extent of the dealer's search based on whether the consumer received any ECOA credit denial letters.
One of the most common violations of the CFA
occurs when the dealer is unable to arrange financing for
a consumer, yet refuses to or cannot return the
consumer's down payment or trade-in. Section 505/2C of
the Consumer Fraud Act requires that a dealer return any
down payment if the furnishing of merchandise, such as
a car, is conditioned on the consumer providing adequate
credit references or having a credit rating acceptable to
the seller.40 The down payment can take any form, including money or goods.4 ' Moreover, the dealer may not
retain any part of the down payment as a fee for investigating the credit of the consumer or as liquidated damages to cover depreciation of the merchandise. 42 Thus,
dealers that retain a portion or all of a consumer's down payment because the consumer has been using the spot-delivered
car have violated section 505/2C of the Consumer Fraud Act43
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E. Illegal Repossession Under the FairDebt Collection Practices Act
The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act'
("FDCPA") prohibits debt collectors4 from repossessing
goods unless an enforceable security interest exists with
respect to the goods. Specifically, section 1692f(6)(a) of
the FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from "[tiaking..
.any non-judicial action to effect dispossession or disablement of property if... there is no present right to possession of the property claimed as collateral through an
enforceable security interest." 46
This section subjects repossession agencies to
liability for repossessing consumer's automobiles when
the creditor does not have a valid security interest or
when the consumer is not in default. Similar to the legal
theories discussed in subsection D relating to violations
of the UCC, if an installment contract is not binding, the
dealer will most likely not have an enforceable security
interest in the consumer's car. Furthermore, if a security
interest does exist, the consumer probably has not had
the car long enough to be in default at the time of the
repossession. Therefore, any security interest that did
exist would not likely be enforceable. By repossessing a
consumer's car when the creditor does not have an
enforceable security interest, a repossession agency
violates section 1692f(6)(a) of the FDCPA. In addition,
under the non-delegable duty analysis explained above
in subsection C, the creditor may also be liable for violating the FDCPA.
F. Conversion of the Consumer's Trade-in Vehicle
When a dealer sells a consumer's trade-in vehicle
and the deal for the car that the consumer wanted to
purchase falls through, the dealer may be liable for conversion of the trade-in. If a sale is truly contingent and it
has not yet been finalized, the dealer does not yet own
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the consumer's trade-in and, therefore, does not have the
right to sell it. As a result, by selling the trade-in prior to
finalization of the deal, the dealer obtains "unauthorized
and wrongful assumption of control, dominion, and/or
ownership" over the trade-in vehicle.47 In this situation,
until the dealer arranges financing, the consumer has an
immediate right to possession of the trade-in.48
G. Conversion of the Spot-Delivered Car
In addition, if the dealer has sold the consumer's
trade-in and then repossesses the car that the consumer
purchased, the consumer may have a claim for conversion of the purchased car.49 Dealers may argue that the
consumer did not have an immediate right to possession
of the new vehicle due to the existence of a financing
contingency in the contract. However, the financing
contingency at issue in a spot-delivery case is a condition
subsequent to the formation of the contract.
As discussed above in subsection A, a condition
subsequent is a condition which divests liability that has
already attached on the failure to fulfill the conditions, as
opposed to a condition precedent which is to be performed before the obligation becomes binding on the
parties. 51 In a spot-delivery transaction, this means that
the retail installment contract has become enforceable,
but its continued enforceability depends on the dealers
ability to obtain financing for the consumer. A condition
subsequent can, however, be waived.5 '
Waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a
known right and can arise either expressly or by conduct
inconsistent with an intent to enforce that right.52 To
determine whether contractual rights have been waived,
5 3 An
the focus is on the intent of the non-breaching party.
implied waiver of a right may exist if the actions of the
person against whom the waiver is maintained are inconsistent with anything other than an intention to waive
such right m
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In the spot-delivery context, assuming that a
financing contingency gives the dealer the right to cancel
the contract, the dealer can waive that right by taking
steps that were inconsistent with the financing contingency, such as selling the consumer's trade-in vehicle.
The financing contingency usually contains language to
the effect that the dealer will return the trade-in vehicle if
and when it decides to cancel the contract. By selling the
trade-in instead of returning it to the consumer, the
dealer relinquishes its right to cancel the contract.
If a waiver of the financing condition occurs, the
dealer can no longer cancel the contract for the
consumer's purchase of the new car. As long as the
consumer is not in default or late on any payments at the
time of the repossession, he has an immediate right to
possession of the new car,55 and if the dealer repossesses
the car, the consumer has a cause of action for conversion.
IV. CONCLUSION
Car dealers, by engaging in spot deliveries rather
than simply waiting for financing approval, create a
maze for themselves. Because they often do not understand the legal issues surrounding their own transactions, they often create problems for themselves and
consumers alike. Transactions, like that of Cathy
Carbuyer described above, need not mushroom into
complicated legal disputes because they are simple
transactions.
Had Daffy Dan not been so concerned with getting Cathy Carbuyer financially and psychologically
committed to buying a car, he would not have been as
likely to violate so many laws. Unfortunately, car dealers
are under severe pressure to sell cars. That pressure will
likely remain indefinitely. Therefore, the best way to
avoid the problems associated with spot-delivery transactions is for both consumers and attorneys alike to
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become knowledgeable of the auto-industry practices.
With knowledge of the motives and methods of car
dealers, consumers can better ensure that they do not fall
prey to spot-delivery. With the knowledge of the various
laws that can be utilized to attack spot-delivery practices,
attorneys will be better equipped to protect the rights of
consumers.
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3. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.18.
4. See 15 U.S.C. 1601.
5. A credit sale is defined by the TILA as "any sale in which the
seller is a creditor." 15 U.S.C. § 1602(g).
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